

EXPANDING THE PROVISION AND IMPACT OF MICROFINANCE IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this report is to outline the current provision of microfinance in Southern Sudan and to raise attention to the constraints that presently restrict its broad based provision and its potential impact.

While a handful of microfinance institutions (MFI's) currently provide microfinance services in Southern Sudan, these only service 1% of potential clients, offer a limited range of products, and do not as yet address the productive, rural and agricultural sectors effectively. Certain MFI's suffer from a high default rate and feedback from the microfinance agencies detail limitations including unstable access to funds (particularly in terms of grant and equity), the lack of a regulatory framework that would enable them to better fund themselves through savings, and poor capacity (poorly trained staff, lack of IT systems, poor monitoring and controls, etc). Further issues that have been hindering the MFI's provision of microfinance include low staff retention and the demolition of markets by local government entities, while their geographical and sectoral outreach is limited respectively by security concerns and client access to productive training.

The main measures with the potential to address these constraints include the better incentivised entry of further large international microfinance actors (attracted through the development of a regulatory framework, a more integrated approach to urban planning that takes into account the importance of building the informal sector as a source of income generation, the comprehensive training of the labour force, and the smoother and enhanced access to loan, equity, and grant funding), in coordination with the enhanced capacity building of the present actors (through the increased provision of technical support to the microfinance agencies). As there are now a number of organizations now involved in the provision of support to the microfinance industry in Southern Sudan, a better coordination between relevant organizations would be recommended to avoid duplication and address all gaps. Finally, given the acute need of recovering communities with little access to capital or finance, the development of agricultural and rural lending methodologies appropriate to the post conflict environment would key in enhancing livelihood possibilities.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The inclusive and diversified access to finance is an important ingredient of the development process that can provide opportunities and spur broad-based growth. Yet, four years since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), the financial sector is still small and under-developed in Southern Sudan despite very strong demand for financial services. Microfinance offers a possibility for income and livelihood generation in a country where only a minute percent of the 8,260,490 population¹ are employed (mostly by government), only approximately 6000 have bank accounts², and only 21,297³ are currently provided microfinance. This paper outlines the current provision of microfinance in Southern Sudan and highlights possible actions to better stimulate the development of the microfinance sector and heighten a broad-based provision.

In this intent, the next section details the context of Southern Sudan as well as the institutional and regulatory framework. An overview of current microfinance services follows, as well as an analysis of the constraints faced by these microfinance providers, and associated policy recommendations in line with the current provision of support.

2. THE INSTITUTIONAL & REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Southern Sudan is currently recovering from more than 20 years of embroiled civil war with the Government of Sudan. In 2005, The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), institutionalizing wealth sharing and autonomy for the South, and starting a 6-year interim period leading to national elections in 2009 and referendum on secession in 2011. The CPA established the Government of National Unity in Khartoum, including 30% representation of the SPLM and smaller parties, and the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) in Juba.

Consistent with the CPA, Sudan operates under a dual banking system (till the end of the interim period) where Northern Sudan uses an Islamic system and the South uses a conventional banking system.⁴ This dual banking system is the foundation for the institutional framework that currently supports the financial sector in Southern Sudan.

The Central Bank is established to cater for both the conventional and Islamic windows, while maintaining one monetary policy for the whole country. With this purpose, the CPA establishes the Bank of Southern Sudan (BOSS) as a "branch" of Central Bank of Sudan (CBOS), with the responsibility to manage the conventional window of the dual banking system that is operational in Southern Sudan. The BOSS is thus responsible for chartering and supervising financial institutions in Southern Sudan, in accordance with recognized regulatory and prudential standards, as set by the CBOS. Since the Deputy Governor of CBOS (who heads BOSS) is accountable to the Governor of CBOS, the Board of CBOS must approve regulations, but BOSS may issue circulars separately⁵ without the approval of the Board.

¹ 5th Sudan Population and Housing Census -2008

² Data collected from the commercial banks, 2009

³ See table B

⁴ The Final CPA – Jan 2005, <http://www.gurtong.org/resourcecenter/documents/>

⁵ With the approval of the President of BOSS (who also concurrently acts as the Deputy Governor of the CBOS)

In its role as regulator and supervisor of financial institutions in Southern Sudan, BOSS recently produced and disseminated eleven Conventional Banking Circulars in 2008, under the authority of the Central Bank of Sudan Act⁶ and the Banking Business (Organization) Act⁷ (two nationally enacted legislations which describe the conventional banking procedures in the South of Sudan, while setting regulation for Northern Sharia based banks). These recently disseminated circulars describe the framework under which the conventional banking financial institutions can operate in Southern Sudan, but do not as yet lay out regulations for the microfinance industry.

At present, MFI's are simply required to register with BOSS for a small fee. In the future, with the support of donor institutions including the MDTF and USAID, BOSS will produce further circulars based on the Ugandan regulatory framework.

3. THE CURRENT PROVISION OF MICROFINANCE SERVICES

Several microfinance institutions (MFI's) operate in Southern Sudan, as well as a number of small cooperatives/ rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCA's/ASCA's). The three main MFI's consist of BRAC SS (a subsidiary of the Bangladeshi INGO of the same name), SUMI (the result of Greenfield investment by USAID), and FSL (funded by ARC International and Micro Africa Limited). Further to the six organizations mentioned below, four new actors (two international, and two local – CDS, and Jahlia Savings and Credit limited: JASCO) are presently considering entry.

Table A – Microfinance Providers in Southern Sudan

MFI	Type of Company	Branches	Staff	Detail	Coverage of the 10 States of Southern Sudan
BRAC SS	NGO (Locally incorporated INGO) & Licensed by BOSS	22	150	One of major MFI's – expanding exponentially since establishment in 2007	5 states (UN, JG, LK, EE, CE)
Sudan Microfinance Institution (SUMI)	Company Limited by Guarantee & Licensed by BOSS	17	62	One of the major MFI's - established in 2003	3 states (LK, WE, CE)
Finance Sudan Limited (FSL)	Company Limited by Shares & Licensed by BOSS	2	12	Established in 2006	2 states (UN, CE)
Amurt (International) South Sudan (AMURT)	Program of locally incorporated INGO	1	5	Established in 2007, shortly to double its portfolio and staff due to grant received from SRF Fund	1 state (NBG)
MRDA	Program of MRDA - Indigenous NGO	1	5	Established in 1991, started microfinance activities in 2007	1 state (WE)
Rural Finance Initiative	Company Limited by Shares	1	2	Established in 2008	1 state (CE)

⁶ 2002, as amended 2005

⁷ 2003

(RUF)					
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* As per December 2008 figures

Presently, the MFI's estimate that they cover only 5% of the available clients in the greater Juba region, and less than 1% of the potential market in Southern Sudan⁸. Whilst the majority of clients are still focused in urban hubs and have a very low rural penetration, the MFI's address mainly women (67%)⁹ and 7 of the 10 states of Southern Sudan already benefit from microfinance services.

Loans range from 75 to 3000 USD and are usually issued for a period between 4 to 8 months (depending on the particular MFI and the respective product type). The MFI's rates are not unduly excessive (range of 15 to 36% per annum) given the high costs of Southern Sudan and the Kenyan averages (30% per annum), but their products are not greatly diversified (mainly group loans, individual loans, and salary loans), and they have not as yet serviced the strong demand for savings products and housing loans.

MFI's clients mainly consist of informal vendors that operate without license or registry. Trade and services sectors are the main client sectors (68%), with only a sprinkling of loans to agriculture & livestock (15%) and manufacturing (11%)¹⁰. Clearly there is much room for expansion both in terms of breadth and depth of coverage, along with a more clear set support for the productive sectors.

Overall, the MFI's experience a low default rate¹¹ in Southern Sudan. An exception to the rule is FSL, which has been suffering escalating defaults (74.3% 30 day PAR) recently due to (a) poor management and controls, and (b) a high concentration of clients in the recently destroyed market place in Juba. FSL has dealt with (a) by hiring new management and introducing relevant monitoring and control systems for staff performance and financial management. It is currently in the process of modifying its strategy for future expansion to resolve (b). SUMI's is another MFI currently experiencing a rate of >5% past due loans (6.15% 30 day PAR) due mainly to late government payments on salary loans. More details are provided on some of these PAR-raising issues in the next section.

Table B – Quality and Size of Loan Portfolio's of Microfinance Providers

MFI	Number of Borrowers (un-audited)	Loan Portfolio (un-audited) / SDG	Average Loan size / SDG	% of Total Microfinance Provision	Products	Loans Past Due (>30 days)	NPL's (>90 days)
BRAC SS	10,402	3, 813, 625	366	42%	Group and individual loans	2.65%	1.96%
Sudan Microfinance Institution (SUMI)	8,657	4,424,946	511	49%	Group, individual and salary loans	6.15%	1.90%
Finance Sudan Limited (FSL)	1,110	676,591	609	7%	Group and salary loans	74.3%	17.9%
Amurt	587	327,650	558	1%	Group loans	28%	28%

⁸ Estimated population of 8.5 Million in Southern Sudan, most of them of very basic income levels (and thus potential clients for MFI's), while loan provision as of Dec 08 totaled approx 20,000 clients.

⁹ According to SUMI and BRAC Nov 08 figures

¹⁰ According to BRAC SS Dec 08 figures

¹¹ The percentage of payments in arrears for >30 days

(International) South Sudan (AMURT)							
MRDA	508	147,400	290	2%	Group Loans	0%	0%
Rural Finance Initiative (RUFU)	33	11,133	337	0%	Group Loans	0%	0%
TOTAL	21,297	9,401,345	441	100%	- -	10.29%	3.95%

As per December 2008 figures

4. CONSTRAINTS TO THE PROVISION OF MICROFINANCE

The MFI's in Southern Sudan face very high demand both for the products they currently offer and the products they could potentially provide. A number of issues have limited the present MFI's ability to expand and meet demand, as well as discouraging the entry of new actors. The most pressing challenges consist of:

4.1 – Scarcity of skilled labour and low staff retention: As with the commercial banks, the MFI's have difficulties finding staff with good financial sector skills given the very narrow and shallow national human resource base in Southern Sudan. While the MFI's provide training to their staff, they have difficulties matching the salary levels of NGO's and international organizations, and consequently struggle to retain their staff for over 2 years.

4.2 – The recent and reoccurring market demolitions: The microfinance clientele often consists of informal vendors that operate without license or registry, often occupying land without the formal title to do so. The recent and reoccurring destructions of informal markets by the local government entities in Juba have thus caused severe losses to the micro entrepreneurs, with echoing consequences to the MFI's who had loaned them funds. Not only has the default rate of certain MFI's substantially risen due to these demolitions, but the forced relocations of the micro entrepreneurs to the edge of town has also challenged the sustainability of certain MFI's strategies (MFI's make fixed cost investment in establishing themselves next to their client base. If this client base subsequently relocates, they will potentially have to reconsider their strategy and relocate. At times they may not be able to service the same clients any longer, despite having developed a certain threshold of trust and investment with the client).

4.3 – Access to funds: The MFI's' lending has been limited by low levels of liquidity, their loan portfolio ranging from 100 to 700% of their deposits. While this was a major problem in 2007, the incoming donors and funding agencies are now substantiating this lack of loan capital for direct on lending. However, microfinance agencies still suffer from delayed and irregular disbursements of such funds, as well as the scarcity of grant and equity capital in their early stages of development. Once the MFI's are able to access a more consistent flow of funds, they will better be able to market their services and outreach to new clients.

4.4 – Lack of a regulatory framework: Currently the MFI's are issued a license to operate, but the precise circulars ordaining regulations are still pending production (the equivalent of the Microfinance Act in Uganda). This delay in setting up a relevant regulatory framework is limiting MFI's ability to take client deposits (savings), which limits the MFI's ability, to service demand and bars an important source of finance for the MFI's.

Further issues that the MFI's face consist of:

4.5 – The need for technical support: The MFI's currently operating in Juba suffer from a low access to best practices (such as the ability to develop new products, train their staff, and monitor their operations adequately, etc.). This is especially important in maintaining a low cost structure, and low default rate and a rapid replication and expansion of operations. The support agencies operating in Juba are hoping to address this issue shortly.

4.6 – Lack of unique national ID and a credit reference bureau: Given the lack of permanent residence in the same area/community this is particularly important for MFI's to lower their cost and risk of operation.

4.7 – Lack of knowledge of government institutions: The MFI's note a general misunderstanding of microfinance and how to facilitate its development. The development of policy at a government level as well as the training of key officials at BOSS, the MCI and the MOFEP, would be recommended.

4.8 – Limited diversification across sectors and productive activities: Due to the low availability of training and sector specific skills transfer in Southern Sudan, lending is concentrated in the services and trade sectors. If further support were provided to micro entrepreneurs to expand diversify their businesses into other productive activities, the MFI's would be able to service a greater clientele, and diversify the risk of their portfolios.

4.9 – Lack of security and transport facilities in non-urban areas¹²: In certain rural areas, businesses expansion is limited due to the lack of security and the lack of transport availability. The provision of these would enlarge the MFI's client base in rural areas.

4.10 – High cost of operation in Southern Sudan: The comparatively higher cost structure in Southern Sudan (compared to other countries in the region) curbs the speed at which the MFI's can reach sustainability (with comparatively similar interest rate and fees). Certain states in particular have high costs of operation and establishment (given low infrastructure levels) relative to the market size. This ratio has guided the current geographical expansion of the MFI's.

4.11 – The recent bankruptcy of the Nile Commercial Bank (NCB): Those MFI's that were keeping their reserves in NCB, are presently facing trouble accessing their capital due to the recent bankruptcy of the Nile Commercial Bank. The GoSS is to bail the bank out eventually, but the process could be quite lengthy and the scarcity of operational capital may hinder the development of these MFI's.

5. CURRENT SUPPORT TO THE MICROFINANCE SECTOR

Currently the main providers of financial and technical support to microfinance agencies are the SSMDf, USAID GEMSS, UNCDF and UNDP as outlined by the table on the following page. A monthly microfinance forum enables information sharing amongst the various shareholders in the microfinance area, whilst the Microfinance Association Southern Sudan (MASS) unifies the MFI actors to address the issues they face as an industry as a whole (training needs, public sector reform, etc.).

¹² Outside Juba

Table C – Organizations Providing Funds and Support to the Microfinance Industry

Organization	Funders	Strategy	Future Available Funds	Loan Terms
SSMDF (Implemented by the FSMF)	CBOS, MDTF, GOSS	Provision of loans, and technical assistance grants to: (1) Start-up MFI's, (2) MFI's scaling towards sustainability, (3) Well established and sustainable MFI's	> \$6.4 million available in 2009/10 (additional \$1 million already allocated)	3 year loans with a 1-2 yrs grace period
<i>USAID GEMSS</i> (Implemented by AED/ACDI-VOCA)	USAID	Operational support and loan capital grants. Capacity building of MFI's, and business development service providers (to enable these to support the MFI sector), as well as support to the Southern Sudan Microfinance Forum.	\$6 million in 2009/10	Grants only
UNCDF	UNCDF	(1) 'MicroLead' ¹³ , a global fund providing funding to internationally recognised MFI's, (2) a sector support programme under formulation with GOSS and UNDP (3) Capacity building of GOSS policy-makers at "Boulder".	\$4.5 million already allocated, further \$3.5 possibly available	5 years, including a 2 year grace period
IFC	IFC	Conducting a feasibility study to evaluate the potential for starting a commercial deposit taking microfinance bank.		
UNDP	UNDP	To (1) enhance linkages between microfinance and vocational/business skills capacity development in Southern Sudan, and (2) support the establishment of Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations (ASCA's) in areas with no operating MF-Providers.	\$300,000 available in 2009 (a further \$700,000 possibly available)	Grants only
SRF	UNDP	Allocating funds for quick recovery impact, peace dividends, and the empowerment of communities affected by conflict and poverty. Awards are allocated per state (500,000 or 1,000,000 USD per state) - A window of opportunity for MFI's providing services in particularly volatile and underserved states.		Grants only
Oxfam Novib/ Triple Jump	Dutch Government /private donors	Provision of loans, seed capital and technical assistance grants to: (1) Start-up MFI's, (2) MFI's scaling towards sustainability, (3) Well established and sustainable MFI's.	> EUR 500,000 available in 2009/10 (additional EUR 600,000 already allocated)	4-yr grace period, at 5% interest rate per annum
DED and Stromme Foundation	DED	Support to the Southern Sudan Microfinance Forum and to the Microfinance Association of Southern Sudan (MASS)		Grants only
GTZ, Mercycorps, Tearfund	EU, GTZ, etc.	Support the establishment of Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations (ASCA's) in areas with high influx of returning IDPs/refugees, as well as in the transition areas		

Despite the product differentiation of the various support agencies, there is still a significant overlap between most of abovementioned programs, and an enhanced sharing of information amongst agencies would be recommended to avoid duplication and benefit from the synergies.

¹³ For details see <http://www.uncdf.org/english/microfinance/uploads/project/2008-10-27%20October%2008%20Savings%20Led%20Market%20Leaders%20LDC%20FIF.pdf>

Further, while these agencies are focussing on the key needs of the MFI industry in Southern Sudan, a gap remains unaddressed – that of the development agricultural finance products to meet the acute lack of finance to the rural and agricultural areas of Southern Sudan today.

Table D – Mapping of Donor and Support Agencies and Gap Analysis

Objective	Organisations	Gap
Achieving greater coordination amongst players involved in promoting Microfinance in Southern Sudan	Southern Sudan Microfinance Forum, MASS, DED, Stromme Foundation	Donor Coordination
Attract new microfinance providers to Southern Sudan	USAID, SSMDF, IFC, Oxfam Novib/ Triple Jump, UNCDF	
Raising the capacity and sustainability of local MFI's	USAID, SSMDF, UNCDF, Oxfam Novib/ Triple Jump	
Enabling the provision of savings products	IFC – (through deposit taking microfinance bank)	
Promoting the development of rural finance products	Through ASCA's : UNDP GTZ, Mercy Corps/Tearfund	Structured products (e.g.telecom)
Enhancing the access of micro entrepreneurs to training and knowledge	UNDP, USAID	
Encouraging the diversification of financial products to meet demand of micro-entrepreneurs	IFC	
Ensuring microfinance is provided to all 10 states in Southern Sudan	SSMDF, SRF	
Promoting the development of agricultural finance products		Presently unaddressed

6. KEY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The most immediate actions that would promote the development of current MFI's as well as encouraging the establishment of new local and foreign actors include:

5.1 – Immediate Priorities for Quick Impact

- The greater coordination between donors, streamlining of donor requirements, and pooling of donor funds to ensure a smoother, punctual and enhanced provision of finance to firms according to their needs. A heightened allocation of equity and grant capital would also be recommended¹⁴ to spur the expansion of the Greenfield and maturing institutions as well as encouraging outreach and innovative MFI's services.
- The draft and dissemination of the relevant circulars pertaining to MFI regulation.
- The dissemination of town's urban planning strategies as well as the supportive allocation of land to micro entrepreneurs. (This might also involve a campaign to market the benefits of registry to micro entrepreneurs). This would guard against both the loss of assets of the struggling entrepreneurs, as well as the demise of the funding microfinance institutions that currently fund them.

¹⁴ Allocated appropriately in coordination with other donors to reduce distortions, encourage competition and spur innovation in the sector.

5.2 – Immediate Priorities for Long Run Success

- The entry of further large international microfinance actors.
- The enhanced provision of technical support to MFI's, particularly in terms of monitoring and standards
- The comprehensive training of the labour force in financial analysis (including MFI staff), and the provision of assistance to MFI's for the design the appropriate staff incentive schemes.

5.3 – Other Important Items to be addressed for Quick Impact

- Additional analysis and support would be recommended to develop and apply agricultural and rural lending methodologies appropriate to the post conflict environment.
- The capacity building of government institutions (MCI, BOSS, MOFEP, as well as the relevant legislative, judiciary and executive bodies), as well as the enhanced attendance and contribution by these government agencies to the established dialogue forums for the microfinance sector (the Microfinance Forum, and the MASS).

5.4 – Other Important Items to be addressed for Long Run Success

- The establishment of a unique national ID system and a credit reference bureau.
- The greater focus on the training of micro entrepreneurs in specific productive sectors, and the connection of this training to the provision of finance by MFI's. This would also involve the support to MFI's to structure their financial products according to needs of the various productive sectors.
- A greater address of security and transport issues in rural areas, to boost the private sector, and thus enhance the MFI's ability to expand their services there in the future.
- Finally, it is of note that given the large expanses and dispersed population of Southern Sudan, there is great potential for the use mobile technology for outreach to rural areas.

7. CONCLUSION

Microfinance has huge development potential in Southern Sudan where the majority of the population live below poverty thresholds and have no access to the banking system. Given the large returnee population and the sparsely available jobs it can provide much needed initial finance to jump start small enterprise for enhanced livelihood opportunities and support to the growing private sector. Current programs have generated much enthusiasm and excitement at all levels of government in the very charged political environment that precedes the upcoming elections in 2010 and referendum for secession in 2011. However, despite the support from a number of support organizations and the presence of a number of MFI's in Southern Sudan since 2005, the development of the industry has been slow and constrained.

The entry of new international microfinance actors would be ideal, as these would rapidly increase provision to large segments of the population with their easily replicable models and

acquired best practices. However, new institutions have refrained from establishing themselves due to the lack of sufficiently stable frameworks to entice entry. Though early entrants such as BRAC (which has been present since 2007) have benefited from easy access to an underserved market and expanded its operations exponentially since, it (like the smaller MFI's) has suffered from the high costs of operation, the risks of a volatile post conflict environment (e.g. the destruction of informal marketplaces where MFI clients operate, the bankruptcy of a local bank), and the low retention of local labour (which switch to higher paid jobs as soon as they have been provided with minimal training). To counter these barriers to entry and help attract large microfinance actors, the development of a regulatory framework, a more integrated approach to the formalization of markets, and a comprehensive training of the labour force would be recommended. Given the risks and costs of the post conflict environment, a smoother and enhanced access to funds (particularly equity and grant funding) would also be necessary.

Whilst the large international MFI's have the potential of significantly increasing service provision, the local MFI's and the ASCA's would have a particular niche in serving rural¹⁵ underserved areas. As these suffer greatly from low capacity and controls, these have a great need for system enhancements and capacity building. In the past such funding has been inconsistent, and it would be recommended that future funding be better coordinated and adjust to the MFI's demand (both in timing and volume) so as to better enhance their growth. Further, the grants provided have at times been fungible, and the training of insufficient quality and efficiency. One methodology of enhancing this would be through the training of the local MFI's and the ASCA's by the international MFI's which could better transfer their best practices to these organizations – especially as they are already on the ground in Southern Sudan. Finally, as the local MFI's and ASCA's are at a very early stage in development, the facilitation of equity investment might be a relevant function to consider.

In addition to building the provision of microfinance, as outlined above, further steps should be taken to increase the impact of microfinance initiatives. A greater coordination amongst the supporters of microfinance, the development of unique national ID and a credit reference bureau, and the capacity building of government institutions – are three examples, which would raise the impact of current initiatives. Similarly, for the success of MFI outreach to non-urban areas areas, an enhanced focus on security and transport facilities by GOSS and other relevant agencies in would be required.

One key lacuna that has not as yet been addressed despite repeated calls from several GOSS staff and consultants as well as local NGOs, is that of linkage between financial service provision and training across sectors and productive activities. Measures addressing these linkages would raise the impact of microfinance substantially. This is particularly important for the agricultural sector, as while it is a major source of subsistence to the majority of the population in Southern Sudan, it is not currently addressed by any of the microfinance providers. The development of the appropriate agricultural lending methodologies for this volatile post-conflict environment would be a crucial for substantial short run broad-based and peaceful growth.

¹⁵ Where rural may mean both outside the main town peripheries, as well as very isolated villages.

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- 5th Sudan Population and Housing Census – 2008, www.cbs.gov.sd

8. APPENDICES

9.1 – Acronyms and Abbreviations

AED	Academy for Educational Development
BOSS	Bank of Southern Sudan, an affiliate of the Central Bank of Sudan
BRAC	BRAC Southern Sudan, a subsidiary of the Bangladesh based International NGO of the same name, and one of the microfinance institutions operating in Southern Sudan
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CBOS	Central Bank of Sudan
FSL	Finance Sudan, one of the microfinance institutions operating in Southern Sudan
FSMF	Frankfurt School of Management and Finance
GOSS	The Government of Southern Sudan
IFC	International Finance Cooperation (the private sector arm of the World Bank)
MASS	Microfinance Association of Southern Sudan
MCI	The Ministry of Commerce and Industry of Southern Sudan
MOFEP	The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning of Southern Sudan
MFI	Microfinance Institution
NGO/ INGO	Non Governmental Organization/ International NGO
ROSCA	Rotating savings and credit associations
SRF -SS	Sudan Recovery Fund – Southern Sudan
SSMDF	Southern Sudan Microfinance Development Facility
SUMI	Sudan Microfinance Institution, one of the microfinance Institutions operating in Southern Sudan
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
GEMSS	Generating Economic Development through Microfinance in South Sudan Project.

9.2 - Currency Equivalents

Currency Unit = Sudanese Pound (SDG)
 US\$1 = SDG 2.24 (February 2009)¹⁶

9.3 - States of Southern Sudan

Southern Sudan consists of the ten states that formerly composed the provinces of:

- Equatoria (CE - Central Equatoria, EE - Eastern Equatoria, and WE - Western Equatoria),
- Bahr el Ghazal (NBG - Northern Bahr el Ghazal, WBG - Western Bahr el Ghazal, LK - Lakes, and WP - Warrap), and
- Upper Nile (JG - Jonglei, UTY - Unity, and UN - Upper Nile).

8.3 – Map of Southern Sudan



¹⁶ <http://www.bankofsudan.org/>